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Summary  findings
Much foreign direct investment is between high-income  production  in the EU is sold back to Japan,  compared
countries, but investment in some developing and  with more than 20 percent  in developing countries.
transition regions, while still modest, grew rapidly in the  In models of horizontal activity, the decision to go
1990s.  multinational is a tradeoff between the additional fixed
Adjusting for market size, much investment stays close  costs involved in setting up a new plant and the savings
to home; adjusting for distance, much heads toward the  in variable costs (transport costs and tariffs) on exports.
countries with the biggest markets. Foreign direct  In models of vertical activity, direct investment is
investment is more geographically concentrated than  motivated by differences in factor costs. Tariffs and
either exports or production.  Thus U.S. affiliate  transport costs both encourage vertical multinational
production in Europe is 7 times U.S. exports to Europe;  activity (by magnifying differences in factor prices) and
that ratio drops to 4 for all industrial countries and to  discourage it (by making trade between headquarters and
1.6 for developing countries.  an affiliate more expensive).
Multinational activity in high-income countries is  The major outward investors carry out much
overwhelmingly horizontal, involving production for sale  horizontal investment in large markets. For U.S.
to the host country market. In developing countries, a  investors, this means Europe, especially the United
greater proportion  of multinational activity is "vertical,"  Kingdom; for Japan and Europe, it means the United
involving manufacturing at intermediate stages of  States. Most EU investments, however, stay within the
production. Thus only 4 percent of U.S. affiliate  EU.
production in the European Union is sold back to the  The major outward investors carry out much of their
United States, whereas for developing countries the  vertical investment closer to home: the United States, in
figure is 18 percent, rising to 40 percent for Mexico.  Mexico; the EU, in Central and Eastern Europe; Japan,
Similarly, less than  10 percent of Japan's affiliate  in Asia.
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email:  avenables@lse.ac.uk1. Introduction:
The last 15 years have seen an enormous growth of activity by multinational corporations,
as measured by flows of foreign direct investment (FDI).  FDI  has grown much faster than either
trade or income; whereas worldwide nominal GDP increased at a rate of 7.2 percent per year
between  1985 and  1997 and worldwide imports at 9.2  percent,  worldwide nominal inflows of
FDI  increased  at  17.6 percent.  These figures  comprise the  financing of  new  investments,
retained  earnings  of  affiliates,  and  cross  border  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Mergers  and
acquisitions are a large proportion of the whole (especially among the advanced countries), with
their value constituting 49 percent of total FDI flows in 1996 and 58 percent in 1997 (UNCTAD,
1998).
The scale of multinational activity is probably better gauged by looking not at FDI flows,
but at sales of multinational firms.  In 1996, US multinational parent companies exported $407.3
billion worth of goods out of total US goods exports of $612.0 billion, two-thirds of the total.
Much of this trade was intra-firm - of the $407.3 billion, some $182.1 billion, or 44.7 percent,
went to exporters' own foreign affiliates or related companies.  Between 1983 and 1995, foreign
affiliates  of  all  nationalities accounted for  between one-quarter  and  one-third  of  worldwide
exports,  according to figures from UNCTAD (1998).  Some commentators have estimated that
multinationals - parents and affiliates combined - are responsible for 75 percent of the world's
commodity trade (Dunning, 1993).
The pre-eminence of multinationals is not  spread equally across  sectors, but  instead is
concentrated heavily in industries characterized by high levels of research and development, a
large  share  of  professional and technical workers,  and production of  technically complex or
differentiated goods.  Firms that invest often have some type of intangible asset they want to keep
within the firm, rather than exploit through licensing.  Furthermore, investing firms are often the
2 larger firms in their industries.
The above figures show that multinational activity now dominates international economic
exchange.  Our objectives in this paper are to draw out the main facts about the geographical
1location of multinational activity and the main theories that seek to explain these facjs. Our focus
on the location of FDI means that this is not a comprehensive  survey of all issues raised by FDI.
We do not  address the  boundaries of the firm (which activities firms transact  internally and
which they contract out in 'arms length' trade (see Markusen, 1995, for a survey)).  Neither do
we deal with the implications of FDI for home or for host economies (surveyed by Blomstrom
and Kokko, 1994, 1997, and 1998).  We start in the next section with an overview of the facts
about the location of multinationals then turn, in section 3, to an overview of theory.  Section 4
looks at empirical studies that have sought to explain the pattern of location.
2: Empirical overview:
Where does FDI come from?  The predominant source of supply is, unsurprisingly, the
advanced countries. 3 In 1997, they controlled 89.8 percent of worldwide FDI stock, compared to
10.2 percent for the developing and transition countries.  Recent FDI flows show some decline in
the dominance of the advanced countries; whereas during the period 1988-92 they accounted for
92.5 percent of total FDI outflows, during the five years from 1993 to 1997, this share had fallen
to 85.3 percent. Within advanced countries, the major single investor is the US which, in 1997,
controlled 25.6 percent of the world's  FDI stock, compared to 45.1 percent for the European
Union  15, and 8.0 percent  for Japan.  Japanese and  European flows boomed during the late
1980s, although have now fallen back to a position broadly in line with existing stocks.
Most of the difference between the advanced and developing countries is accounted for by
sheer economic size, and the difference in outflows relative to GDP is perhaps less than might be
expected.  Figure  1 maps out the time series of FDI outflows relative to source country GDP.
Outward flows from the advanced countries averaged 1.3 percent of their GDP each year from
1993 to 1997, with the EU having much the highest rate (almost 2 percent of GDP), largely on
the basis of intra-EU investments.  For developing countries, outward FDI flows averaged 0.8
percent of their GDP during 1993 to  1997, compared to 0.3 percent from 1988 to 1992, a large
increase.
2Figure  1: Sources  of Outward  FDI
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Turning to the destination of FDI,  most goes to the advanced industrial countries.  In the
period 1985 to 1997 the developed countries received fully 71.5 percent of FDI flows. Inevitably
most of this is advanced to advanced country FDI.  Of the G-7 countries, France, Germany, Italy
and the UK sent more than three-quarters of their  1997 FDI  flows to  the rest  of  the OECD;
Canada, Japan, and the US sent more than 60 percent most recently.  This pattern of reciprocal
FDI  shows up strongly at the industry level as well, with a large share of flows appearing as
intra-industry investment.
While intra-OECD investment and intra-industry investment within the OECD have been
long-established facts, an emerging trend is the rise of FDI to developing countries.  The share of
worldwide FDI received by the developing and transition economies jumped from 21.8 percent in
the  1988 to  1992 period,  to  39.8 percent  in the  1993 to  1997 period.  The picture  is more
dramatic if we look at FDI relative to the size of the host country's economy, as shown in figure
32.  During the five years  from  1988 to  1992, advanced countries- received FDI  inflows at an
average  annual rate  of 0.90  percent  of their  GDP,  while developing and  transition  countries
received FDI  at an average annual rate of 0.78 percent of their  GDP.  By 1993 to  1997, the
inflow rate of developing and transition countries had more than doubled to 1.91 percent of GDP,
while that for the advanced countries had decreased slightly to 0.87 percent of GDP .
Figure  2:  Hosts  of Inward  FDI
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Among developing countries, the distribution of FDI is quite uneven.  Only 10 countries
accounted for two-thirds of all inward flows during the most recent five years for which data are
available,  1993  to  1997  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  China,  Hungary,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,
Mexico,  Poland,  and  Singapore).  China alone  received an  annual average  of  30.6  percent.
Indeed, China accounts for much of the increase in flows to developing countries, with its share
oi world total FDI flows rising from 2.9 percent for the period 1988 to 1992, to 12.2 percent for
1993 to 1997.  In nominal dollar terms, inward direct investment to China increased from $3.2
4billion in 1988 to $45.3 billion in  1997.  The source of all these flows, about five percent of
China's  GDP in 1997, remains hotly debated.  The main sources are considered to be Chinese
business groups resident in Asia, Chinese businesses resident in China that send their money out
and then bring it back to get certain benefits available to foreign investors (the so-called 'round
trippers'),  and investors from the advanced industrial economies.
In contrast, all of sub-Saharan Africa including South Africa received an annual average
of 3.2  percent of all flows to  developing and transition countries between 1993 and  1997, a
decrease of almost 2.1 percentage points from the annual average of 5.3 percent during the 1988
to 1992 period.  Relative to world inflows, sub-Saharan Africa's  share increased slightly, from
around 1.0 percent between 1988 and 1992, to around 1.3 percent between 1993 and 1997. This
is also reflected in its inflows of FDI relative to host country income, as in figure 2, where we
see some increase in  FDI to  Africa, but  at levels dwarfed by inflows to  East Asia and Latin
America.
3. Location of multinationals:  theory.
There are two main - and quite distinct - reasons why a  firm should go multinational.
One is to better serve a local market, and the other is to get lower-cost inputs.
FDI  designed to  serve local markets is often called 'horizontal'  FDI,  since it typically
involves duplicating parts of the production process as additional plants are established to supply
different locations.  This form of FDI usually substitutes for trade,  since parent firms replace
exports with local production.  The motive is to reduce the costs involved in supplying the market
(such as  tariffs or  transport costs) or  in  some other  way to  improve the firm's  competitive
position in the market.
In  contrast,  FDI  in  search of  low-cost inputs  is  often called  'vertical'  FDI,  since it
involves slicing the vertical chain of production and relocating part of this chain in a low-cost
location - for example, assembling electronic goods in Asia even though component manufacture
and final sales might take place in the US.  The cheap inputs might be labour - of different skill
5levels  - primary  commodities,  intermediate goods,  or  even  access to  externalities,  such  as
knowledge spillovers.  Vertical FDI is usually trade creating, since products at different stages of
production  are  shipped  between  different  locations.  The  distinction between  vertical  and
horizontal FDI  can of course become blurred - one plant may serve  both functions,  and the
decision to  open a  plant to  serve a market will depend on local costs - but is nevertheless a
fundamental one.
3.1 Horizontal FDI and market access:  A firm can supply a  foreign market with its product
either  by  exporting,  or  by  producing  locally  - becoming  multinational.  Under  what
circumstances will it choose to become multinational?
Establishing local production will involve the firm in a variety of additional costs.  Some
of these  are the  costs of  dealing  with foreign  administrations, regulations,  and  tax  systems.
These  may  be  mitigated by  collaboration  with  local  firms  through joint  ventures,  licensing
arrangements, or sub-contracting.  Some are production costs, both variable and fixed, their size
depending on factor prices and technology. The presence of plant level economies of scale will
raise the cost of establishing foreign plants, as compared to producing from a single home plant.
On the other side of the equation, switching from exporting to local production will bring
cost savings, the most obvious of which are savings in transport costs or tariffs.  To these might
be added other benefits of proximity to the market,  such as shorter delivery times and ability to
respond to local circumstances and preferences.
Theoretical modelling of this sort of FDI has typically posed the issue as one of a trade-
off between the additional fixed costs involved in  setting up  a  new plant,  and  the  saving in
variable costs (transport costs and tariffs) on exports.  Analysis is usually based on  a 'new trade
theory'  model, in which there are distinct firms,  and the issues of increasing returns and market
structure are addressed explicitly (Smith, 1987, Horstmann and Markusen, 1987, and Markusen
and Venables, 1998).  What are the main results from this modelling?  The first point is that the
value of FDI to the firm may exceed the simple calculation of net costs, since establishing local
6production may have a strategic value.  In an oligopolistic environment each firm's sales depend
- in equilibrium - on the marginal costs of all other firms.  If one firm reduces its marginal costs
then it may induce rival firms to reduce their sales, and this will be of value. 4 Essentially, FDI
serves  as  a  commitment to  supply the  local  market,  and  this  commitment may change the
behaviour of competitors.
Turning to  the  location of FDI,  the theory predicts that FDI  will replace exports  in
markets where the costs of market access through exports (tariffs and transport costs) are high, or
where the costs of setting up a local plant are low.  These predictions seem to be at odds with the
facts of high (and rising) FDI  between economies with low (and falling) trade barriers,  e.g.,
within the EU  and between North America  and Europe, although the apparent  contradiction
might be resolved by the simple fact that countries with low trade barriers also tend to have low
barriers to FDI.
The theory also  predicts that FDI  is more  likely to  replace exports  the larger  is  the
mnarket. There are two reasons.  The first is that the plant-specific fixed cost may be spread over
more units of output the larger is the market.  The second is that larger markets will tend to have
more local firms,  and consequently more intense competition than smaller markets.  This  will
lead to a lower price and, if the marginal cost of supply through exports is relatively high, be
particularly damaging to the profitability of exporting, tipping the firm's  decision in favour of
local production.
Extending these models to a full multi-country framework, Markusen and Venables (1998)
analyse the mix of multinational and national firms operating in each country.  They show that
multinationals will  be  prevalent the  more  similar  are  countries  (in  size,  and  also  in  other
economic dimensions, such as.technology and factor endowments). Thus, as Europe has become
integrated - essentially increasing market  size - it has become more  worthwhile for US  and
Japanese FDI to enter,  even though trade barriers and other costs of supplying Europe through
trade have been declining.
73.2  Vertical  FDI and factor endowments:  A significant part of multinational activity now takes
the  form  of  firms  shifting a  stage of  their  production process  to  low-cost locations.  The
economic analysis of this turns on the idea that different parts of the production process have
different input requirements and, since input prices vary across countries, it may be profitable to
split production, undertaking unskilled labour-intensive activities in labour-abundant countries,
for example.
The classic analysis of this comes from Helpman (1984, 1985) and Helpman and Krugman
(1985), and is based on an extended Heckscher-Ohlin  trade model with two factors of production
and  two  sectors,  one  perfectly competitive, producing  a  homogeneous good  under  constant
returns to scale, and the other producing differentiated products under increasing returns to scale.
Firms  in  the  increasing returns  sector have distinct  'headquarters'  and production  activities,
which can be separated between countries.
In this model, free trade in goods will bring about the international equalisation of factor
prices, providing the countries'  relative endowments of  the two factors are not  too  different.
When this occurs there is no incentive for firms to separate headquarters and production, so there
is no  multinational activity.  But  if  the relative endowments are  sufficiently different  - for
example, one economy has a much higher endowment of labour relative to capital than the other
- then trade does not equalise factor prices.  It is then profitable for firms to divide activities,
unsurprisingly putting the  more capital-intensive part  of the  firm  (e.g.,  headquarters)  in  the
capital-abundant  country.  The  capital-abundant  economy  then  becomes  an  exporter  of
'headquarters' services to its production operations located in the labour-abundant  economy.
While this  analysis provides an  elegant way of incorporating multinationals in  classical
trade  theory,  its  applicability  is  severely  diminished  by  the  maintained  assumption  that
international transactions are  frictionless  - there  are no  trade  barriers  of  any  sort,  and  no
additional costs are  incurred in splitting production.  What happens when we  allow for  such
frictions?
83.3 FDI, factor prices, and location:  Adding trade frictions brings two new forces into play.
The first is that transport costs on trade in final goods destroy factor price equalisation (unless
relative  endowments are  identical); the  consequent international differences  in  factor  prices
increase the incentives to  split production.  The second is that costs of splitting production -
additional costs incurred by having different parts of the firm located in  different countries -
make multinational production less attractive.  Whether firms go multinational, and where they
locate different activities, depends on the interaction between these forces.
To analyse this, suppose there are many countries, at varying distances from an economic
center from which they import goods (including components) and to which they export at least
some of their final output.  Transport costs both on imports (of intermediate goods and final
products) and on export sales are higher at more remote locations.  If there is  some mobile
activity - say one stage of a production process - where will it locate?
Locations further away from the centre  are unattractive, in  so far  as firms face heavy
transport costs; Radelet and Sachs (1998) show how large these cost penalties can be.  On the
other hand, since these locations also face transport costs on their other tradeable activities, their
factor prices will be lower.  In particular, the price of factors used intensively in the location's
export activity will be low, so investment projects that are intensive users of these factors may be
attracted to remote locations.  Generally, whether a project will be established in  a particular
country depends on the factor intensity of the project, relative to  the factor intensity of other
exports from the country,  together with the  'transport intensity'  of the project, relative to the
transport intensity of other goods traded by the country.  These considerations allow us to predict
which sort of projects will locate close to established manufacturing regions, and which will go to
5 more remote countries.
3.4:  Agglomeration:  There  is some evidence that FDI  is spatially more clustered than other
forms of production.  This could appear in the data for reasons we have already seen.  The
market size and factor endowment models suggest that all locations have some production, but
9only some locations will have FDI, meaning that FDI will appear to-  be clustered.  It also appears
because of cross-country variations in  legal framework, particularly in  transition  economies,
where privatization programs have been more or less open to foreign investors.
Alternatively, clustering of FDI may be due to positive linkages between projects, creating
incentives to locate close to other firms.  Several mechanisms seem particularly important.  One
is  the  spillovers created  by  research and  development; much has been  written  on  this  (see
Audretsch, 1998), although not particularly from the perspective of FDI.  Another is confidence,
and the possibility that firms 'herd';  firms are uncertain as to whether a particular country is a
good location for FDI,  and  take the success of one firm as  a  signal of underlying national
characteristics.  A  third mechanism arises  from the supply of,  and  demand for,  intermediate
goods;  once again,  this  has  been  extensively analysed,  although not  particularly  from  the
perspective  of FDI.6
4.  Location of multinationals: empirical studies.
We now review the empirical studies on the determinants of the location of FDI.  These
have been undertaken for different regions of the world, and each region has presented its own
set of patterns.  We therefore organize the material by region.  The best documented and most
heavily researched FDI  flows are those from the US,  and we  start with  these, then turn  to
outflows from Japan and Europe.
4.1: US Outward FDI:
Table 1 summarises the US position, showing the direct investment position abroad (the
stock of direct investment), sales by US-owned affiliates, and, for comparison, US goods exports,
all  for  1996.  The main determinants of the location of FDI  are proximity and host country
income level.  This 'gravity' relationship has been used extensively in explaining trade flows, and
10Table 1 United States Direct Investment Position Abroad and Sales by Affiliates, 1996
(Billions of US Dollars or Percent)
Area  Direct  Share by  Affiliate  Share by  % of  US  Share by  Ratio  of
Investment  Region  Production  Region  prod.  by  Goods  Region  affiliate
Position  %  %  US  Exports  %  Prod. to
affiliates  Exports
sold in US
All Countries  777.2  100.0  1861.4  100.0  10.1  625.1  100.0  3.0
Advanced  536.3  69.0  1434.1  77.0  7.8  356.7  57.1  4.0
of which:
European Union 15  337.2  43.4  949.6  51.0  4.2  127.7  20.4  7.4
of which:
United Kingdom  122.7  15.8  287.0  15.4  6.0  31.0  5.0  9.3
Canada  91.3  11.7  231.0  12.4  28.0  134.2  21.5  1.7
Developing  240.9  31.0  427.3  23.0  18.0  268.3  42.9  1.6
of which:
Latin America  147.6  19.0  178.7  9.6  20.5  109.4  17.5  1.6
of which:
Mexico  19.9  2.6  46.7  2.5  39.9  56.8  9.1  0.8
Brazil  28.7  3.7  49.8  2.7  4.3  12.7  2.0  3.9
Asia  67.2  8.6  198.3  10.7  15.3  120.1  19.2  1.7
of which:
Singapore  14.0  1.8  72.6  3.9  21.8  16.7  2.7  4.3
Greater China  18.5  2.4  49.1  2.6  11.8  26.0  4.2  1.9
Africa  6.8  0.9  19.8  1.1  21.6  10.6  1.7  1.9
of which:
South Africa  1.5  0.2  5.6  0.3  0.5  3.1  0.5  1.8
Middle East  7.8  1.0  10.6  0.6  15.0  20.0  3.2  0.5
East Europe and  6.7  0.9  13.7  0.7  0.9  7.6  1.2  1.8
FSU
11Notes: Greater China is China and Hong Kong, and FSU is Former Soviet Union.  Levels may not sum to total for all
countries and shares may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
Sources: Multinational direct investment  and sales data are from the US Bureau of Economic  Analysis,
www.bea.doc.gov.  Direct investment data are from data file idnO217.exe,  "U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad,
1982-1997.  "  Sales data are from data file idnO214.exe, u S. Direct Investment Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent
Companies and their Foreign Affiliates, Preliminary 1996 Estimates."  Figures for direct investment position abroad are
for all US affiliates, while sales data are for majority-owned affiliates.  Trade data are from the US Census Bureau,
www.census.gov,  Exhibit 13: Exports, Imports, and Balance of Goods by Countries and Selected Areas --  1996.'
typical findings are that two-thirds of the geographical pattern  of trade can be  'explained'  by
these few variables (see Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995).  Our own analysis shows that a similar
finding holds for multinational affiliate sales.
The interesting question then is to see the ways in which the pattern of FDI differs from
that of trade, and the final column of table 1 sheds light on this, giving US affiliate production in
each region or country relative to exports from the US to each region or country.  On average,
this ratio is equal to three, so the main outliers are the regions for which this number is markedly
different from three.  Several points stand out.  First, developing countries do poorly, having less
than half the level of affiliate sales relative to trade as do developed countries (1.6 as compared to
4.0). Second, neighbouring countries do poorly; this is essentially  due to very high trade volumes
between the US and Canada and Mexico. Third, the European Union has a high ratio of affiliate
production to exports, and FDI is uneven within the EU, with the UK having the largest share.
To go further we make the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI.  Horizontal
FDI was studied by Brainard (1997), who asked the question, how does the US supply foreign
markets?  She took as  dependent variable the share of exports  in  total US  sales  (defined as
exports plus affiliate sales) in each market (also disaggregated by industry). Her findings are in
line with what we would expect.  The share of affiliate sales is higher the higher are trade' costs,
and  lower the  lower is per  worker income in the host country; this  conforms with  the poor
performance of developing countries we noted above.
Wheeler and Mody (1992) included market size in their analysis of capital expenditures by
multinational affiliates, so while their results do not cover the choice of serving a market, they do
provide a measure of how market size affects inward multinational activity.  They found that
12market size had a positive influence on capital expenditures by manufacturing affiliates of US
multinationals between 1982 and  1988, with an elasticity of  1.57.  Elasticity for the highest-
income countries was 1.86, while that for the lowest-income countries was 0.74.  Other variables
that  proved  important in  raising capital expenditures by  these affiliates included quality of a
country's  infrastructure,  its  degree  of  industrialization,  and  the  current  level  of  foreign
investment.  They interpreted these three variables as measures of agglomeration effects.
What about vertical FDI?  We can start investigating this by looking at column 5 in the
table, which gives the percentage of US affiliate production that is sold back in the US.  This
share  is  more  than  twice  as  high  for  developing countries  (18  percent)  than  for  advanced
countries (7.8 percent) indicating, as would be expected, that factor price differences play a role
in  driving such investment.  Indeed, Wheeler and Mody alluded to  a  wage effect  in vertical
production  when  they  separately  tested  capital  expenditures  in  the  electronics  industry,  an
important offshore assembly industry. 7 They found low labour costs were strongly related to the
level  of capital expenditures by  US electronics affiliates, with larger  elasticity in  low income
countries than high, indicating the importance of labour costs to vertical investment decisions.
Shatz (1999) analyses vertical exports by US-owned manufacturing affiliates in developing
countries.  He finds that the level of sales back to the US by these affiliates is higher in countries
with low labour costs and tax rates.  Low transport costs to the US and a high degree of trade
openness are also important determinants of vertical sales, as the models suggest.  These findings
hold true for the ratio of sales back to the US relative to total sales by these affiliates. 8
Returning to table 1, Mexico and Singapore stand out as having high sales back to the US,
with Mexico selling almost 40 percent of its output to the US and Singapore selling almost 22
percent. 9 Africa also stands out because of the resource intensity of affiliate production.  The one
outlier among the advanced countries is Canada, from which US affiliates seli 28 percent of their
output back  home.  The  high  level  of vertical  investment in  Canada  and  Mexico might  be
explained by three factors  - proximity, allowing producers to coordinate their production more
easily  as they  slice it  into sections; economic integration, creating a  more  stable investment
13climate; and Mexico's  maquiladora program, started in the 1960s, enabling US producers to set
up assembly plants to take advantage of Mexico's lower wages.  A reform in  1983 simplified the
initiation  of maquiladora projects,  and  inward FDI  (from  all sources) skyrocketed from  $478
nmillion  in 1983 to $3.6 billion in 1989 (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997).  Much of this was from the
UJS  (almost $1.7 billion in 1989, for example) and most of it went into maquiladoras.  US data
show that sales to the US from US-owned affiliates in Mexico increased 19.6 percent annually in
nominal  terms  from  1986 to  1995.  Worldwide,  sales to  the  US  from  US-owned affiliates
increased only 8.6 percent annually.
4.2: Japan's Outward  FDI:
What are the similarities -- and differences - between Japanese and US FDI?  Table 2
gives the basic data, and several points are immediately apparent.
First,  the preponderance of investment to advanced countries is as great for Japan as for
the US, with the US the dominant host.  This is almost entirely horizontal FDI.  A distinctive
feature  of  Japan's  multinationals is  the  way  their  export  strategy  has  interacted  with  their
investment  strategy.  The  heaviest  Japanese  investments  in  the  US  in  the  1970s  were  in
distribution  rather  than production  so  Japanese companies could market  their  durable-goods
exports, such as automobiles.  Subsequent investment in productive facilities occurred in those
sectors where widespread distribution networks had been set up.
Another  result of this export success was that the threat  of quantitative restrictions  on
exports, starting in the late 1970s, turned into a significant motivator for Japanese FDI in the US
and Europe. Gittelman and Dunning (1992) found that Japanese investment in both the US and
Europe responded to such threats, though investment activity in the US seemed to lead investment
activity in Europe by several years during the 1980s.  While the Japanese were putting most of
their efforts into productive facilities in the US in the early 1980s, they were still expanding their
distribution network investments in Europe.  In both the US and Europe,  after  investment in
productive facilities, follow-on investment arrived to establish local production of inputs. 
14A second characteristic of Japanese FDI is the significant amnount  of resource-based FDI,
particularly in Latin America and Australia (see Caves, 1993, and Drake and Caves, 1992).  We
see from table 2 that around one third of output from Japanese FDI in these regions is exported
back to Japan.
The third feature of Japanese FDI is its role in the development of the wider East Asian
economy, and the extent to which it has involved relocation of Japanese production to lower wage
economies as a base from  which to  supply the Japanese market and export to third markets.
While FDI played only a modest role in the development of  some of the first wave of Asian
newly industrialised countries (Taiwan and Korea) it has played a much larger role in the second
wave,  with  the  share  of  foreign affiliates  in  manufacturing sales  exceeding 40  percent  in
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore.  In fact, while Japanese manufacturing FDI
to developing countries as a group stagnated from the mid-1970s to at least the late 1980s, FDI to
Asia increased steadily (Takeuchi, 1991).  Japanese investments in some of these countries are
given in table 2.
Much of this investment is vertical, and column 5 indicates the relatively high levels of
sales by these affiliates back to the Japanese market.  This figure certainly understates the extent
to which this is vertical FDI; less than half the output is sold in the host country, and much goes
to other affiliates in the region.  Exports to Japan have been particularly important in general
machinery,  electrical  and  electronic  machinery  and  equipment,  transport  equipment,  and
precision equipment, and most sales back to Japan are to the parent company.
Kimura (1998) contrasted the activities of majority-owned  Japanese affiliates in East Asia
(specifically,  Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  Philippines,
Indonesia, and China) with those in the rest of the world.  Japan's Asian affiliates are much more
likely to be part of vertically integrated production networks, while the non-Asian affiliates are
more likely to serve foreign markets horizontally.  Not only do the Asian affiliates sell more back
to Japan, they also sell a much higher share of their production to Japanese affiliates.
15The importance of production costs in choice of locations was confirmed by a firm level
suirvey, analysed by Mody, Dasgupta, and Sinha (1998).  Japanese firms investing in Asia were
mnotivated  partly by high Japanese capital costs.  Raw labour costs did not prove an attractor, but
labour quality did, suggesting that unit labour costs rather than raw labour costs mattered, since
Table 2.  Japan:  Direct Investment Position Abroad (1994) and Sales by Affiliates (1991)
(Billions of US Dollars or Percent)
Area  Direct Investment  Share by  Affiliate  Share by  % of
Position  Region %  Production  Region by  production by
Region %  Japanese
affiliates sold in
Japan
All Countries  436.6  100.0  498.0  100.0  14.2
Advanced  317.0  68.4  402.0  80.7  12.8
Oaf  which:
UJnited  States  194.4  41.9  229.0  46.0  12.2
Euiropean  Union 15  84.3  18.2  133.0  26.7  9.5
Of which:
UJnited  Kingdom  33.8  7.3  61.0  12.2  7.4
Australia  23.9  5.2  22.0  4.4  37.9
Developing  146.6  31.6  96.0  19.3  20.1
Of which:
Latin  America  55.6  12.0  9.0  1.8  28.7
Of which:
Brazil  8.8  1.9  3.0  0.6  41.8
Asia  76.2  16.4  83.0  16.7  18.7
Of  which:
Greater  China  22.6  4.9  26.0  5.2  19.9
Indonesia  17.0  3.7  1.0  0.2  12.5
Singapore  9.5  2.1  29.0  5.8  20.0
Thailand  7.2  1.5  5.0  1.0  19.5
Malaysia  6.4  1.4  6.0  1.2  19.7
Africa  7.7  1.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Middle East  4.7  1.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
East Europe and FSU  0.8  0.2  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
OJ  which:
Russia  0.4  0.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
IHungary  0.3  0.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Notes: Greater China is China and Hong Kong.  EU is the EU 12 for sales data.  Levels may not sum to total for all
countries and shares may not sum to 100 because of rounding.  In addition, the sales data probably understate the level
of actual sales, as explained in Kimura.
Sources: Investment Position is from OECD (1997).  Sales data are based on Kimura (1998), Table 5. 1, p.  115-6, and
are available only in billions of dollars.
16labour costs throughout Asia are lower than in Japan.  Finally, a firm's  export propensity from
Japan was negatively correlated with the firm's  share of investment in Asia.  Mody, Dasgupta,
and Sinha interpret this to  mean that Japanese firms have not invested in Asia under threat of
trade barriers.  Rather, they have gone in search of efficient production and low-cost inputs.
Reviewing changes in the pattern of Japanese FDI since 1972, Kojima (1995) shows both
a  changing composition of  investments,  and  a  geographical broadening of  those  investments
throughout Asia.  The concentration in  manufacturing has  declined, with  a  rapid increase in
service  investment;  the  average  labour  skill  requirements  have  increased  correspondingly.
Broadening also took place  significantly, with investment spreading in waves from  early host
countries to  neighbours.  In  1972, for example, the top three  Asian locations for  machinery
manufacturing (Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea) held 81.5 percent of total Japanese investment
stock in machinery manufacturing in Asia.  By 1989, the top three  (Thailand, Singapore, and
Taiwan) held only 51.3 percent of the total.  And Thailand, which held 5.1 percent of the total in
1972, moved up to first place by 1989, with 18.6 percent.
4.3: Europe's Outward  FDI:
Table 3 summarises the European Union 15's outward FDI flows between 1992 and 1994.
The first thing to notice is the enormous share of intra-European investment flows.  More than
two-thirds of FDI flows stayed within Europe during those years, although this share appears to
have peaked in 1992, falling to 44 percent in 1997.
This  peak  likely was  related to  the  EU's  Single Market Program.  Barrell  and  Pain
(1997),  based  on  Pain  (1997) and  Pain  and  Lansbury  (1997),  report  that  UK  and  German
investment to the rest of the EU from the 1980s through 1992 rose sharply in those sectors that
previously had the highest barriers to cross-border market entry.  Among the EU  12, intra-EU
investment averaged 29.9  percent  of total  outward investment from  1984 to  1988, and  61.7
percent during the next five years, to 1993 (European Commission 1995, 1997).
17Table  3.  European  Union  15:  Direct  Investment  Flows Abroad
(Billions of US Dollars  of Percent)
Area  Flows Abroad  Flows Abroad  Flows Abroad  Average Share by
1994  1993  1992  Region 1992-1994
All Countries  76.0  75.4  87.1  100.0
Advanced  61.4  64.3  81.7  86.6
Of which:
European  Union  15  50.3  47.1  64.0  67.4
United  States  7.7  16.1  9.0  13.9
Developing  14.6  11.1  5.4  13.4
Of which:
Latin  America  5.7  3.0  3.9  5.3
Of which:
Argentina  0.6  0.3  0.4  0.5
Asia  3.5  2.3  1.6  3.1
Of which:
Malaysia  0.5  0.7  0.5  0.7
Greater  China  0.2  0.4  -0.2  0.2
Africa  0.6  0.1  0.9  0.7
Of which:
Morocco  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.2
Souith  Africa  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.3
Middle  East  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.3
East  Europe  and FSU  4.0  4.2  3.1  4.8
Of which:
Czech  Republic  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.3
Hungary  1.0  1.4  1.3  1.6
Poland  0.7  0.9  0.3  0.8
Russia  0.4  0.1  n.a.  0.2
Notes:  Greater  China  is China  and Hong  Kong. FSU is Former  Soviet  Union. Levels  may  not sum to total for all
countries  and shares  may  not sum to 100  because  of rounding.
Source:  European  Commission  (1997). Figures  are for equity  and other  capital  outflows  to affiliates  and do not include
reinvested  earnings.
EU  policy  measures  have  affected  more  than just  the level  of  intra-EU  flows.  Baldwin,
Forslid,  and Haaland  (1996) reported  above-trend  increases  in investment  into Spain and Portugal
18after those two countries joined the EU in  1986.  Furthermore,  during the early years of the
creation of the Single Market, foreign investment fell in the European countries not participating,
in particular the countries of the European Free Trade Area.  After it became clear that many of
them would link to the EU through the European Economic  Area, investment recovered.
What  then  can  we  say  about horizontal and  vertical  investment by  the  Europeans?
Excellent firm-level data exist for  Swedish multinationals, and these have become almost as
heavily researched  as US  multinationals."'  Regarding horizontal investment, Ekholm  (1998)
found that distance and plant-level scale economies were negatively related to the decision to
serve a market through affiliate sales, rather than exports.  However, once this decision had been
made affirmatively, distance was positively correlated with the level of affiliate sales relative to
total Swedish sales (affiliate sales plus exports).  Higher transport costs were also weakly related
to higher affiliate sales, even after taking account of distance.
Ireland  presents  a  compelling  case  study  of  vertical  and  horizontal  investment  by
Europeans and  by outsiders into Europe.  As Barry and Bradley (1997) show,  more than 85
percent of the gross output of foreign-owned manufacturing plants is exported, and more than 65
percent of intermediates used by these plants is imported, emphasising that these plants are firmly
in  a vertical chain of production.  However, the destination of exports shows that  some are
clearly horizontal, while others are likely vertical.  For example, UK-owned plants export only
39 percent of their output, but  of this,  almost 60 percent goes to  the UK.  US-owned plants
export 96 percent of their output, but only 7.9 percent goes back to the US - less than the share
of total Irish manufacturing exports to the US.  Instead, almost 80 percent stays within the EU
(including Ireland).
One aspect of Ireland's  role as an export platform is the importance of  agglomeration
economies.  Barry and Bradley report that surveys of executives in the computer,  instrument
engineering, pharmaceutical, and chemical sectors show that their decision to locate in Ireland is
strongly influenced by the presence of other key firms in their industries.
19At the eastern end of the EU, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is now integrating into
European production networks.  European investors are the dominant participants in these newly
opened economies, particularly investors from Germany and Austria.  The total direct investment
position at the end of  1995 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland was $24 billion,  of
which 68.7 percent came from the EU 15, with 34 percent from Germany and Austria alone.
Hungary offers the best example of the relationship between FDI  and trade in Eastern
Europe.  It has been the primary spot for investment in the CEE, attracting the largest absolute
and relative  (to  GDP) flows,  on  average five percent  of  GDP annually from  1990 to  1997
(Kaminski and Riboud, 1999).  Kaminski and Riboud show that foreign-invested firms have been
the driving forces behind Hungary's increasing exports.  In 1989, these firms were responsible
for 10.4 percent of Hungary's exports.  By 1997, they were responsible for 74.2 percent.  The
authors speculate that many of the exports by foreign-invested  firms are actually intra-firmn,  since
many of  the  firms  locating in  Hungary  are subsidiaries of  large multinationals with  known
international production networks.  For example, exports of piston  engines leaped  from  $85
million in 1993 to $1.5 billion in 1997.  Not coincidentally, between those two years Volkswagen
established  Audi  Hungaria  Motor  as  a  greenfield  investment to  assemble  piston  engines.
A[though not quite as dramatic, other networks have been established, particularly in electronics
with subsidiaries of Philips  and IBM.  One other result of  the integration of Hungary  with
production networks is that exports to the EU have changed from natural resource- and unskilled
labour-intensive in 1989, to technology- and skilled labour-intensive in 1997.
One other aspect of European investment deserves special mention.  Given the number of
Europe's  countries with imperial histories, patterns of European FDI show the importance of
cultural  linkages  and  colonial  heritage.  For  example,  between  1992  and  1994  France's
cumulative flows of FDI  to  Morocco totalled $287 million, while cumulative flows to  South
Alrica totalled $56 million.  In contrast, the UK's  flows to Morocco totalled only $90 million,
while flows to South Africa measured $1.3 billion.
205: Conclusions:
The  patterns  of  FDI  and  the  results  of  empirical  research  produce  several  areas  of
agreement among scholars regarding the geography of international investment.  Distance and
market size are extremely important in determining where firms establish their foreign affiliates.
Adjusting for market  size, a large share of  investment stays close to  home, and adjusting for
distance, a large share of investment heads toward the countries with the biggest markets.  In
fact, the majority of the world's direct investment is horizontal, designed to serve customers in a
host-country market rather than in the worldwide market.  As a result, most investment can be
found in the advanced industrial countries.
However, the direction of investment has shifted in the 1990s, with a larger share heading
toward  developing  countries.  Of  these,  China  dominates.  Relative  to  developed-country
investment, much of this  is vertical.  As seen  in  the cases of  US  and Japanese investment,
affiliates in developing countries sell a larger share of their output to their home countries than do
affiliates in developed countries.  Even so, on average, affiliates in developing countries sell a
majority of their output in their host economies.
Recently, the competition for FDI inflows has grown fiercer, with the transition countries
and other developing countries making efforts to attract multinationals.  In addition, technological
change and  an  open world trade  environment allow firms to  split production processes more
easily.  Combined with the fact that multinationals are active traders - exports from parents and
affiliates together dominate world trade - these patterns raise a number of issues for the future.
One is whether the developing countries will continue to attract an increasing share of investment
flows.  Another is how much higher vertical investment will rise as a share of total investment.
The final pattern to watch will be the growth of developing country multinationals.  Developing
countries control only a small portion of world outward direct investment stock, but their share is
rising.  Their future activities will confirm what we know about distance, host country market
size, and the dominance of horizontal investment, or suggest new questions about the location of
multinational firms.
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Endnotes:
'Much of the data mentioned come from a special extract of the UNCTAD FDI/TNC  Database
(UNCTAD,  1999).  The investment flows measured here generally include equity flows and debt
between  a  parent  company and  an  affiliate  in  which  the  parent  holds  at  least  a  10 percent
ownership interest,  as well as retained earnings of the affiliate.  However, both the components
and threshold differ for some reporting economies.
2Caves  (1996)  gives  a  comprehensive  description  of  the  characteristics  of  firms  that  go
multinational and in which industries they are most likely to be found.
3We classify  countries  in  this  section  according  to  UNCTAD  (1999)  with  minor  changes.
Advanced countries include  the European Union  15, Gibraltar,  Iceland, Norway,  Switzerland,
Canada, the US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Israel.  Developing countries comprise the
rest of the world,  including the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe,  as well as
South Africa; UNCTAD classifies the transition econornies as a separate group and South Africa
among the advanced countries.
4This result is model-specific.  Cournot oligopolists will reduce their sales.  Bertrand oligopolists
will increase their sales.
'See Venables and Limao (1999) for analysis of this.
6See Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) for the analysis of agglomeration patterns created by
inter-firm demand and supply linkages.
7Wheeler and  Mody  did  not  note the  vertical sales  intensity  of  the electronics  industry.
However, Shatz (1999) shows using US Bureau of Economic Analysis data that US affiliates
in the electric and electronic equipment industry in developing countries sold more than 43
percent of their output back to the US between 1986 and 1995.  This is the highest proportion
of vertical sales of any of the broad industry classes in the data.
8The labour cost findings of Shatz and Wheeler and Mody do not appear in every analysis,
however.  In an early paper investigating vertical investment in the 1960s, Kravis and Lipsey
(1982) found a negative association between labour costs and the level of  exports in most
industries investigated, but this relationship was never statistically significant.  Rather, market
size regularly  emerged  as  statistically and  economically significant, though  there  was  no
elasticity  computation.  Kravis  and  Lipsey  took  this  finding  to  imply  that  there  were
economies of  scale  in  export production  that  made output cheaper  to  produce  in  larger
markets.
269When oil,  finance, and  real estate investments are excluded from  the totals  (not shown),
Singapore's share of output sold back to the US leaps to almost 36 percent,  while Mexico's
increases to nearly 41 percent.
'0See  also  Barrell  and  Pain  (1999)  for  Japanese investments and  trade  restraints.  The
experience of Japanese multinational expansion into the US and Europe points to one other
determinant  of  location,  the  real  exchange  rate.  A  number  of  authors  have  found  a
correlation  between a  home-country appreciation and increased investment into the market
with the depreciated rate, and Japanese investment into the US is one example of this (Drake
and Caves,  1992).  When assets become cheaper, buyers emerge.  For further research, see
especially Blonigen (1997) and Froot and Stein (1991).
"1 The Industrial  Institute  for  Economic and  Social Research  (IUI) completed six  surveys
between  1970  and  1994.  An  early  and  important  study  based  on  these  surveys  was
Swedenborg (1979).  The papers in Braunerhjelm and Ekholm (1998) are among the latest
making use of these surveys.
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